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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of June 27, 1993, the United States
launched twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles from ships in the
Red Sea in the direction of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Most of the
missiles struck the headquarters building of Iraq's Intelligence Ser-
vice. Three of the missiles landed off-target in residential areas, where
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1966; MA.
Harvard University, 1966.
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five to eight persons were killed and one dozen seriously injured. U.S.
President Bill Clinton expressed regret for the casualties.1
The Clinton Administration explained that the raid was a re-
sponse to a plot by Iraq to assassinate former U.S. President George
Bush. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Administration said, orches-
trated the plot, hence the choice of its headquarters as the target.
The Clinton Administration took the matter to the United Na-
tions Security Council (Council), where it presented evidence to sub-
stantiate a plot by Iraq to assassinate Bush. Iraq denied the charge.
The United States said that its raid was lawful self-defense. Iraq asked
the Council to condemn the United States for aggression. The Coun-
cil declined to do so, thus siding with the U.S. position.
Although the Security Council took no action against the United
States, the U.S. assertion of self-defense is valid only if a series of
factual and legal issues are resolved in its favor. The Council did not
address these issues in detail. In particular, the legality of the raid
turns on the distinction in international law between self-defense,
which is lawful, and reprisal, which is not.
This Article examines the factual and legal issues involved in the
Baghdad raid to determine whether the United States acted lawfully
and whether the Security Council proceeded properly in declining to
issue a condemnation. The raid took place against the backdrop of
bitter relations between the United States and Iraq in the wake of the
Gulf War of 1991. This Article considers the effect of that situation on
the actions of the parties and of the Security Council.
H. THE EVIDENCE OF AN IRAQI PLOT
Under the United Nations Charter (Charter), a state that uses
force against another state in self-defense is required to report the
matter immediately to the Security Council so that the Council may
decide what action to take.2 Under the Charter, the Council has pri-
mary responsibility for maintaining peace,3 and where one state uses
force against another in purported self-defense, it has the power to
take action to terminate the hostilities, or to act on behalf of either of
1. John Lancaster & Barton Gellman, U.S. Calls Baghdad Raid a Qualified Success:
Intelligence Complex Hit Hard; 3 Errant Missiles Strike Houses, WASH. POST, June 28,1993,
at Al; Derek Brown, 14 Wide Boys, 2 Big Guns, GUARDIAN, Sept. 4, 1993, at 6.
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see infra text accompanying note 45.
3. Id. art. 24 (giving the Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security").
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the contending states.4 Following the raid, the United States asked
the Security Council to meet so that it could "brief' the Council on its
action.' Iraq also informed the Council about the raid, portraying it-
self as a victim of aggression.
6
At the Security Council meeting on the raid, U.S. Ambassador
Madeleine Albright said that a car bomb hidden in a Toyota Land-
cruiser was smuggled on April 13, 1993, from Iraq into Kuwait, where
it was discovered and seized by Kuwaiti authorities.7 George Bush
was to visit Kuwait the following day. Kuwaiti police arrested sixteen
suspects and charged twelve in connection with the alleged plot
against Bush.' Ten of the suspects were Iraqis.9
The bomb was examined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(F.B.I.), which, Ambassador Albright told the Council, concluded that
key components-including the remote-controlled firing device, the
plastic explosives, the blasting cap, the integrated circuitry and the
wiring-were built by the same person or persons who built bombs
previously recovered from the Iraqis. Certain aspects of these de-
vices have been found only in devices linked to Iraq and not in de-
vices used by any other terrorist group.10
To demonstrate motive, Albright cited statements by the Iraqi
government suggesting that it planned to punish President Bush for
having initiated war against Iraq in 1991.11 She said that U.S. officials
had interviewed the sixteen suspects" and that two of the Iraqi sus-
4. Id. arts. 39-51.
5. Letter dated 26 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United Statcs of
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Counczil U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., S.C. Doc. S/26003 (1993). See also U.N. SCOR, 49th Sezs , 3245th mtg.,
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (1993) (president of Security Council at the June 27, 19)3 meet-
ing, stating that the "Security Council is meeting in response to the request contained in a
letter dated 26 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, document S!2L9P3")
6. Letter dated 27 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security, Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Ses., U.N.
Doc. S1260004 (1993).
7. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3245th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. SfPV.3245 (1993) [hereinafter
U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg.].
8. Martin Walker, Attack on Baghdatt Forensic Findings Convinccd Us of Mtn's
Guilt, GuARDAkN, June 28, 1993, at 8; see also Wliam Maclean, Iraqi Accused in Bush Plot
Says Was Only Smuggling, REUrER LmR. REP., July 5, 1993. available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File (ten charged with plotting homicide of Bush, two with complicity in the
plot, two with illegally procuring liquor discovered with the explosives).
9. Kathy Evans, 14 Ride Boys, 2 Big Guns-, the Trial, GLtARDrAN, Sept. 4, 1993, at .
10. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 4.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 3.
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pects told F.B.I. personnel that they had been recruited and instructed
in Basra, Iraq, by "individuals associated with the Iraqi intelligence
service," who provided them with the car bomb on April 10, 1993."3
According to the U.S. evidence, the plotters had formulated a tri-
partite plan that involved blowing up the Toyota alongside Bush's mo-
torcade. Failing that, the Toyota was to be exploded during a public
speech by Bush at a university campus. If that was not possible, then
a suicide bomber wrapped in explosives would assault Bush. Wali
Ghazali, one of the Iraqi suspects, said he was approached by an Iraqi
intelligence agent who provided the Toyota Land Cruiser outfitted
with explosives and asked him to take it to Kuwait and to assassinate
Bush.14 Ghazali told the security court in Kuwait that he had been
instructed to detonate the rigged Toyota near Kuwait University,
where he was told Bush would give a speech, and, if that plan failed,
to carry out the suicide bombing. U.S. officials said that the Toyota
contained 176 pounds of plastic explosives, enough to injure persons
within a 400 yard radius when detonated. 15
Kuwaiti police foiled the alleged plot when they found the Toyota
with its bomb while it was parked in an agricultural area near Kuwait
City at a sheep pen owned by one of the persons subsequently
charged in the case.' 6
Albright said that additional information from "various classified
intelligence sources," which she declined to disclose, supported the
U.S. conclusion that the Iraqi government ordered the operation. 1
7
She said that "the Iraqi government, at its highest levels, directed its
intelligence services to carry out" the plot.' 8
Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, addressing the Security
Council in reply, denied that Iraq was involved in a plot against for-
13. Id. at 5.
14. Patrick Cockburn, Did Iraq Really Plot to Kill Bush?, INDEPENDENT, July 4, 1993,
at 12. Ghazali reportedly named the Iraqi agent as Abu Rafed. Id.
15. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 4-5.
16. Scott Baldauf, Defendants in Kuwait Deny Conspiracy in Trial of Attempt on
Bush's Life, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 1993, at 7 (indicating that Kuwaiti police
said they were on alert following a tip from sources in Iraq).
17. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 6; see also R. Jeffrey Smith & Ann
Devroy, Clinton Says U.S. Action 'Crippled' Iraqi Intelligence; Officials Decline to Release
Further Details, WAsH. PosT, June 29, 1993, at A14 (stating "[n]either Albright nor other
officials have discussed the nature of the additional intelligence evidence").
18. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 6; see also Mitchell Locin, How U.S. Built
Case Against Iraq; Evidence Ties Government, if not Hussein, to Plot, CHI. TRm., June 29,
1993, at 1 (stating that the Administration was not able to tie Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein personally to the plot); Smith & Devroy, supra note 17.
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mer President Bush.19 "That story was completely fabricated," he
said, "by the Kuwaiti regime for wel-known purposes relating to its
policy towards Iraq and with a view to damaging and harming my
country."'2 Hamdoon said "that for similar purposes certain organs
within the United States Administration found in this story a pretext
for an act of aggression against Iraq in pursuance of the United States
policy of containment against Iraq."21 Hamdoon challenged the
United States "to come up with any clear evidence acceptable to an
impartial third party."22
On behalf of Iraq, he presented a complaint to the Security
Council, asking it to condemn the United States. "With this act of
aggression," said Ambassador Hamdoon, "the United States of
America has breached its responsibility as a permanent member of
the Security Council and has violated the norms of international law
and of the Charter."' Despite Ambassador Hamdoon's request, no
Security Council member introduced a resolution to condemn the
United States or to deal wvith the matter in any other fashion. The
19. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 11 (Ambassador Hamdoon stating, 'h2
Government of Iraq has denied, and continues to deny, any role with respect to the alleged
attempt.").
20. Id.; see also Paul Quinn-Judge, CIA Report Casts Doubt on Kuwait Asscrtion of
Plot on Bush- Bid for Tougher U.S. Line on Iraq Seen As Motive, BosTo: GL,3cE, May 27,
1993, at 9 (stating that Kuwait was concerned that the Clinton administration %ias not suffi-
ciently anti-Iraq and, thus, Kuwait may have "cooked the books" to give an apptearane of
Iraqi threat).
21. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 11. The reference to "containment" % a2
to a policy announced by the Clinton Administration in May 1993 to forego the prior U S.
policy of playing Iraq and Iran off against each other and instead to "contain" them both,
meaning to keep them equally weak. The new policy was said to stem in part from an
assessment that an anti-U.S. rapprochement was developing between Iran and Iraq. Mar-
tin Indyk, special assistant to the president for Near Eastern Affairs, explained that the
administration had concluded that Iraq was a "criminal regime, beyond the pate of interna-
tional society, and in our judgment, irredeemable," and that the administration % ould not
"seek or expect a reconciliation with Saddam Hussein's regime." R Jeffrey Smith &
Daniel Wflliams, White House to Step Up Plans to Isolate Iran, Iraq; Administration to Ty
'Dual Containmen4' WASH. PosT, May 23, 1993, at A26. One aspect of the policy, again as
explained by Indyk, would be the maintenance of a U.S. military presence in the regjon on
an indefinite basis. John Law, Martin Indyk Lays Out the Clinton Approach, MIDDLE E.
INT'L, June 11, 1993, at 3.
22. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 11.
23. Id at 12; see also Iraq Replies to US larning Against Any Retaliation, BBC Su'.,.
mARY OF Womi BROADCASTS, June 30, 1993, pt. 4, Middle E. Page, at ME'172 I (state-
ment of Iraqi National Command of the ruling Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party calling the raid
an "act of aggression"); Iraq Wants Clinton Trial for Missile Attack, AcENCE Fr'_,cE
PnnssE, July 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (Iraqi parliament d2-
dared it would seek to try President Clinton for the raid and that it would seek comp.n-a-
tion for the victims).
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meeting adjourned without expectation of further consideration, and
the Security Council did not return to it.24
At the meeting, Albright presented substantial evidence of the
discovery of a bomb in Kuwait at the time of Bush's visit there, but
less evidence of a plot to assassinate Bush and less still of Iraq's direc-
tion of such a plot. The alleged leader of the plotters, Ra'ad Assadi,
was said by Kuwaiti officials to have admitted to being a colonel in the
Iraqi secret service. However, in a security court in Kuwait, Assadi
denied he held such a position and identified himself as a professional
smuggler who had been asked to smuggle the group into Kuwait.2 -
U.S. investigators visited Kuwait in May 1993 and apparently were
unconvinced of the existence of an Iraqi plot against Bush as they
made a second trip to Kuwait in June.26 The Administration did not
explain what the investigators learned during the second trip that dis-
pelled the doubts left after the first trip.
In the Kuwaiti security court following the raid, two of the ac-
cused-Assadi and Ghazali-gave confessions, while the others de-
nied any involvement.27 Most of those charged in the case were
apparently connected with the lucrative trade of smuggling liquor
from Iraq, where liquor can legally be sold, into Kuwait, where it can-
not. If Iraq indeed recruited a group of whisky smugglers to assassi-
nate Bush, then such a group would neither be the most reliable for
such a project nor the most technically competent.28
Assadi, in his confession, said he had been instructed to plant
bombs in Kuwait to disrupt Bush's visit, but not to kill him. Ghazali
alone confessed to a plot to kill Bush. In his incriminating statement,
Ghazali said that he had been told to set the bomb off during a Bush
24. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 25 (Security Council president stating at
end of meeting, "No proposal on this item has been submitted on which the Security Coun-
cil is required to take action. Therefore, I understand that the Council has thus concluded
its consideration of the item before it.").
25. Walker, supra note 8; see also MacLean, supra note 8 (accused Salem Nasser al-
Shammari, a Kuwaiti of Iraqi origin whom Kuwaiti police linked to Iraqi intelligence, told
the security court he was a smuggler but knew nothing of a plot against Bush; judge re-
marked that al-Shammari looked familiar; al-Shammari replied he had been jailed 15 times
in Kuwait for smuggling).
26. Smith & Devroy, supra note 17.
27. Baldauf, supra note 16; see also Defendants in Alleged Bush Assassination Plot
Claim Innocent, Xinhua News Service, July 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Xinhua File.
28. Cockburn, supra note 14; Seymour Hersh, A Case Not Closed, NEW YORKER, Nov.
1, 1993, at 80, 91 (quoting Clinton administration officials stating that the group had "an
Abbott and Costello quality").
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speech at Kuwait University. In fact, Bush was to speak at a different
university in Kuwait. Moreover, Bush would be riding in an armor-
plated vehicle, so setting off the bomb in the manner Ghazali said was
planned, in the general vicinity of the speech, would not likely harm
Bush. The U.S. evidence relating to the circuitry in the bomb might
link the bomb to Iraq, but not necessarily to a plot to kill Bush.2 9
The U.S. evidence was questioned by critics outside the Security
Council on the grounds that the criminal case in Kuwait against four-
teen of the suspects was about to go to trial. Critics argued that if the
United States thought the evidence solid, it should have awaited a
guilty verdict so that the justice of its position would be more appar-
ent.30 As matters stood, the United States had inflicted punishment
on Iraq prior to a determination of guilt in court.31
The Clinton administration dismissed the possibility that Assadi
and Ghazali were tortured into confessing. The suspects were ar-
raigned only on April 27, eleven days after their arrest; prosecuting
authorities gave no reason for this delay, thus, feeding concern they
had been coerced to confess.32 The suspects were not allowed the
assistance of lawyers prior to the start of trial.3
29. Cockbum, supra note 14.
30. Robert Fisk, Some Fundamental Difficulties; Egypt Codd Be Next to Face the
Wrath of Islam. Robert Fisk Looks at a President Under Seige, I DtDErN. T, July 5, 19J .3,
at 21 (stating that the West generally was pleased with the raid even though the alleged
would-be assassins have not yet even been found guilty in their Kuait trial"); see also
U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 11 (Iraqi Ambassador Hamdoon stating that the
United States "has accused and sentenced Iraq, and has carried out its sentence, all % itheut
providing evidence against it or inviting it to clarify its position").
31. Commentary. Attack Symptomatic of Double Standard. MIDDLE E. I-TL-Iv- .X-
REP., June 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File (stating "it nould have
been more proper for President Clinton to wait a few days until the Kuwvaiti 'judiciary' has
its say and pronounces its verdicts on the suspects"). The raid also cast doubt on the objec-
tivity of the pending criminal proceedings in Kuwait because it would be aik% ard for
Kuwait if its courts exonerated the suspects after its major ally, the United States, retali-
ated against Iraq. An acquittal would cast doubt on the propriety of the raid. See US
Warns Iraq of New Action, IRISH TINis [IR. Ti',snS], July 5, 1993, at 6 (Amnesty Intera-
tional stated that the accused had been prevented from seeing lawyers prior to the start of
court proceedings-the period during which several of the accused allegedly made volun-
tary incriminating statements-and that the trial was tainted by the U.S. declaration of
compelling evidence of a plot against Bush; Mishari al-Anjari, Kuvait Justice Mimter,
replied that the proceedings were fair and would not be influenced by the raid).
32. Kathy Evans, Verdicts Due on Bush Assassination Conspiracy, C.,LG' rY HEPAUD.
Oct. 30, 1993, at A9.
33. Mark Fmeman, Miscast Characters Accused of Plot to Kill Gcorge Bus,; Kivalt:
Iraq's Alleged Infiltrators, a Ragtag Crew Including a Smuggler and Nurse, LA. TI. ES,
Oct. 30, 1993, at Al.
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A number of the accused made confessions prior to the arraign-
ment but retracted them, saying that they had been beaten during in-
terrogation. 4 Of those who confessed, only Ghazali and Assadi stuck
to their confessions during the trial. Assadi, despite maintaining his
confession, told the media that he was beaten into confessing. Ghazali
made no such charge, but on the first day of trial he appeared in court
with an apparently fresh scar on his forehead.3 5 Kuwait had been re-
cently criticized by human rights organizations for routinely using tor-
ture to gain confessions from suspects.36
The primary material evidence cited by Ambassador Albright, as
indicated, was certain technical characteristics of the explosive device,
which she said showed that the device was of a type used only by Iraqi
government agents.3 7 This evidence was not scrutinized by the Secur-
ity Council. However, seven bomb experts approached by journalist
Seymour Hersh said that the devices were, in Hersh's paraphrase,
"mass-produced items, commonly used for walkie-talkies and model
airplanes and cars ."3  The New York Times editorialized that Al-
bright's technical evidence "was not conclusive enough for a reason-
able citizen to join her in being 'highly confident' that force... was
the wisest course. 39
The Security Council should have conducted its own investigation
of the facts, rather than accept the U.S. claims at face value. Under
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has the capacity to carry out
factual investigations. It has, on occasion, used this power to positive
effect where facts have been in dispute between two contending
states; but too often, as in the present case, it has acted without seri-
ously evaluating the allegations of a claimant state.40
Although the U.S. allegations were not frivolous, they were
hardly conclusive in the form in which Albright presented them, par-
ticularly because the United States, by Albright's acknowledgment,
relied in part on information she did not disclose. Yet, she was asking
34. Id.; see also Evans, supra note 32 (stating that most of the defendants told the
security court they had been beaten by police but that defense lawyers decided not to raise
the issue in court because they thought it would not serve their clients' interests).
35. Hersh, supra note 28, at 90.
36. Id. at 90 (citing reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch).
37. See supra text accompanying note 10.
38. Hersh, supra note 28, at 85.
39. Was This Strike Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A16.
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 29 ("The Security Council may establish such subsidiary or-
gans as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."); see also John Quigley,
Security Council Fact-Finding: A Prerequisite to Effective Prevention of War, 7 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 191 (1992).
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the Council to conclude that Iraq was responsible for the alleged plot
without the benefit of this information. If the Council was to take
appropriate action on the Iraqi complaint, it needed to investigate the
facts itself.
The Security Council's decision not to investigate leaves the va-
lidity of the U.S. claims in doubt. The U.S. charge and the Iraqi denial
were not resolved by any impartial body. Since the time of the Secur-
ity Council's meeting, no additional evidence has come to public at-
tention that would show that either the United States or Iraq has the
better factual case.
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Beyond issues of fact, the U.S. reliance on self-defense poses a
series of legal issues. None of these, however, were explored in depth
by the Security Council during its meeting on the raid. The various
elements of self-defense need to be explored before the legality of the
U.S. action can be resolved.
Ambassador Albright clarified that the United States relied on
self-defense, and only on self-defense, to justify its raid. Ve re-
sponded directly," she said, "as we are entitled to do under Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the exercise of self-
defense in such cases."' 41 Self-defense involves the use of force by a
state that is under attack when it finds force the only way to repel the
aggressor state. Self-defense is considered a right that pre-dates the
U.N. Charter and is deemed an aspect of a state's sovereignty.42 The
rationale for self-defense rests in the state system that underlies inter-
national law. States are the subjects of international law and thus
have a right to self-preservation.
While the existence of self-defense is clear, its limits are contro-
versial. The values underlying self-defense potentially conflict with
the major principle underlying the contemporary international legal
order, namely, that states are not to use armed force against each
other. Self-defense is an exception to that principle since it allows a
state to take up arms against another state.
If one state invades another with military force and the victim
state calls out its troops in defense, conflict between the two principles
41. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7. at 6.
42. 1 D.P. O'CoNNE.L, INTERNATIONAL LAW 341 (1965) (calling selcfen-. -a baaic
right of states").
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is virtually nonexistent. However, if self-defense is construed broadly
enough to allow a state to fight a state that has used force against it in
the past and which it suspects of intending to do so again in the future,
then there is a possibility that a state will take up arms to confront an
imaginary attack.43 Since states have a variety of interests that may
lead them to use armed force against another state, a broad construc-
tion of the right of self-defense opens the path to aggression. An
overly broad right of self-defense may erode the prohibition against
the use of force between states.
With this potential conflict in mind, the drafters of the U.N. Char-
ter wrote a prohibition against aggression. Article 2(4) states, "All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations."' They also wrote a provision, article 51,
allowing for self-defense. Article 51 reads, "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. ' 45
The article 51 definition of self-defense was carefully crafted to
ensure that self-defense remains within appropriate bounds and that it
not jeopardize article 2(4). The article 51 definition contains a
number of limiting concepts. One is that the attack must be armed,
meaning a military action of some type. Neither a verbal attack nor
economic measures will suffice even though they may adversely affect
the target state. In an analysis of the Baghdad raid, this requirement
raises the question of whether Iraq, if it sent a group to assassinate
former President Bush, committed an "armed attack."
Another requirement is that the attack must be against a state
rather than merely an armed action that the state finds objectionable
or that might violate its rights under other norms of international law.
This limiting concept raises the issue, critical to an analysis of the
Baghdad raid, of whether an armed attack against an ex-president of a
state is an armed attack on the state itself.
43. Id. at 339-40 ("Obviously self-defence is not a satisfactory juridical conception if it
allows for anticipatory action on the part of a State which fancies that its security is imper-
iled .... ").
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
45. Id. art. 51.
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Another limiting concept is that the armed attack "occur." This
limitation, the scope of which remains controversial, incorporates two
separate temporal elements. One relates to whether the target state
has begun to use force and the other relates to whether it has stopped.
The first temporal element allows the use of force in self-defense only
if an attack has commenced or at least is so imminent that it is obvious
that it is about to commence. Thus, a state's concern due to political
developments or even threats by the target state to attack in the fu-
ture will not suffice. The second temporal element relates to the ter-
mination of an attack. If an attack has taken place-for example, the
aerial bombardment of a town in the other state-but has ended, then
the attack cannot be labeled as "occurring." This element is relevant
to an analysis of the Baghdad raid, since the alleged plot against for-
mer President Bush had been thwarted at the time of the raid.
Article 51 does not specifically mention, but is construed to con-
tain, two additional limitations. The first is that defensive force is per-
missible only if force is necessary to repel the aggressor state.4 ' Thus,
if the aggressor state sends troops across the border, but is in the pro-
cess of withdrawing them, the target state may not need to use force
to protect itself.47 The second additional limitation, closely related to
the first, is that a state acting in self-defense may use only the force
necessary to repel the aggressor state. It may not repel the aggressor
and then continue to inflict additional military damage.4 '
This complex of limiting concepts, similar in many respects to the
restrictions on defensive force in domestic penal law, 9 gives some as-
surance that self-defense will not become so vague that the prohibi-
tion against use of force between states will be jeopardized.
As applied to the Baghdad raid, these limiting concepts require
focus on a number of questions relating to the U.S. action. For the
U.S. claim of self-defense to be sound, the alleged Iraqi plot must
qualify as an "armed attack" and, additionally, the armed attack must
have been against the United States as a state. The "armed attack"
must have been in progress at the time of the U.S. raid. The raid must
have been necessary to stop the Iraqi plot, and the force employed in
46. LAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE By' STATES 376
(1963).
47. Id. at 261.
48. I&
49. WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN Scorr, CRIMINAL LmvW 454-61 (19S6); PLE~flE
BouzAT, TRArIP THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT PfNAL 213-17 (1951),
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the raid must not have been greater than was needed for that purpose.
These issues are examined in the following sections.
IV. WAS THE ALLEGED PLOT AN ARMED ATTACK
ON THE UNITED STATES?
The first issue is whether the alleged assassination plot was an
armed attack, and if so, whether an armed attack on the United
States. President Clinton said, "The Iraqi attack against President
Bush was an attack against our country, and against all Americans."' 0
Ambassador Albright told the Security Council that Iraq committed
"a direct attack on the United States."51 She said, "[I]n our judgment
every member here today would regard an assassination attempt
against its former Head of State as an attack against itself, and would
react."52 Albright was not challenged at the Council meeting on this
point. However, the proposition that a plot, particularly one discov-
ered before being brought to fruition,53 to kill an ex-president is an
armed attack against the state of that ex-president is hardly self-
evident.
State practice on the issue is sparse. In the U.N. Charter era,
there have been few confirmed assassination plots organized by a
state, and these have been directed against states that had no practical
possibility of responding with force.54 The United States collaborated
with Congolese political figures in the assassination of Congolese
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba,55 and it tried to assassinate Cuban
President Fidel Castro.56
50. Bill Thrque, Striking Saddam, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1993, at 16.
51. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 6.
52. Id. at 3.
53. This aspect will be examined infra Part V.
54. See Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 Atil. J.
IN'L L. 284 (1992).
55. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 19-70 (1975) [hereinafter Alleged Assassination
Plots]; see id. at 263 ("the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisen-
hower" and "the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, authorized an assassina-
tion plot [against Lumumba]," but this plot was not carried out). See also JOHN QUIOLLY,
THE RusEs FOR WAR: AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM SINCE WORLD WAR II 127-32 (1992).
Here the assassination was carried out, albeit by Congolese elements allied with the United
States rather than by the United States itself, and once Lumumba was dead the pro-U.S.
elements were in power and had no quarrel with the U.S. role. Id.
56. Alleged Assassination Plots, supra note at 55, at 71-135. Various plots to assassi-
nate Fidel Castro were authorized by Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles.
Id. at 264.
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Although article 51 does not further define "armed attack," the
concept typically involves a more generalized form of hostilities than a
single murder." 7 The most elaborate effort to define unlawful force
was the U.N. General Assembly's 1974 resolution defining aggression.
In a listing, the Assembly said that the following acts committed by a
state would constitute aggression: (1) an invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a state against the territory of another state; (2) a
bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of
another state; (3) a naval blockade; (4) an attack by the armed forces
of a state on the military forces of another state, even if situated
outside the territory of the other state; (5) the use of armed forces
already situated by agreement inside another state for purposes going
beyond the host state's consent; (6) allowing another state to use terri-
tory from which to launch aggression; (7) sending irregular armed
forces into another state.5s
The General Assembly stated in the resolution that this listing
was not exhaustive. 59 However, all the acts listed relate to armed ac-
tions directed against a state, not against individual persons, whether
or not public officials, who are citizens of a state. The only element of
the General Assembly definition arguably relevant to the alleged Iraqi
action is the sending of irregular armed forces into another state, but
even there the implication is that these groups are sent for combat,
not as a "hit squad."
Deadly force by one state against a citizen of another is, to be
sure, treated in international law as an act entailing liability to the
other state. For example, if police officials torture a detained foreign
citizen to death during interrogation, their state is responsible to the
state of which the victim was a national60 It is also an act incurring
state responsibility if a state kidnaps a person out of the territory of
another state.61 However, such acts are not an armed attack on the
state itself.
57. See e.g., LN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PVBLIC IN"TERNATIONAL L'vw 504-34 (2d
ed. 1973) (finding "armed attack" to involve "offensive operations by the forces of a
state").
58. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, art. 3, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.LM. 710 (1974).
59. Id. art. 4 ("The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council
may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter."),
60. BRoNwmL, supra note 57; see also DEREK BowErr, SELF-DEFVE r I'.TErPA.
TIONAL LAW 93 (1958) (stating that an attack on an individual is not an attack on the
state).
61. RESTATFmNT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELA-nos L.Aw Or THE Ura-ED SrA-E
§ 432 (1987) ("A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the tern-
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The difference between the two forms of liability is significant.
Comparable in a rough sense to the distinction in domestic law be-
tween tort and crime, the distinction brings substantially different con-
sequences. A state whose citizen has been tortured by officials of
another state has rights comparable, again using the domestic analogy,
to those of a civil litigant, namely, to make a claim against the other
state and to seek compensation. In the case of an armed attack
against the state, however, the target state may take up arms in its
defense and may complain to the United Nations requesting collective
international action.62
The issue of attacks on citizens as armed attack against their state
was addressed by the Security Council during discussion of a United
States aerial raid into Libya in 1986. U.S. planes hit Libya's two major
cities, killing thirty-seven civilians.63 In justification, the United States
said that Libya planned to attack thirty U.S. embassies at various loca-
tions, although it gave no supporting details about particular sites or
times of the planned attacks. It claimed as well that Libya had organ-
ized the bombing of a West Berlin nightclub that killed an off-duty
U.S. soldier and injured many others.64 The United States argued that
attacks on U.S. citizens constituted an "armed attack" against the
United States within the meaning of article 51.
The U.S. assertion in 1986 that Libya's alleged involvement in the
nightclub bombing constituted an attack against the United States is
similar to Ambassador Albright's assertion that a plot against Bush
tory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized
officials of that state."); U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-78 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding
violation of U.N. Charter in kidnapping by U.S. officials in another state); F.A. Mann,
Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in IN.
TERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPILExITY 407 (Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory eds., 1989)
("A State which authorizes the abduction of a person from the territory of another sover-
eign State is guilty of a violation of public international law. This principle is supported by
considerable State practice, numerous decisions of municipal courts and a large body of
doctrinal opinion."); see also John Quigley, Our Men in Guadalajara and the Abduction of
Suspects Abroad: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 68 NOTRE DAMI.E L.
Rnv. 723, 728 (1993).
62. International Law Commission, Draft articles on State responsibility, art. 19 (inter-
national crimes and international delicts), in I.LC. Report to General Assembly, U.N.
GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMNI' 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (pt. 2); see also John
Quigley, The International Law Commission's Crime-Delict Distinction: A Toothless Tiger?,
66 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE [R.D. INT'L & D. COMt'.]
117 (1988).
63. Seymour Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 17.
64. Announcement by Speakes, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1986, at A13.
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was an attack against the United States. In the Libya case, most of the
Security Council members were critical of the United States for the
raid. A draft resolution to condemn the United States for aggression
gained nine affirmative votes but was vetoed by France, Great Britain,
and the United States.61 The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolu-
tion condemning the raid.6 6
V. DOES THE LAW OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION ESTABLISH THAT AN ATTACK ON
CITIZENS IS AN ATACK ON THEIR STATE?
The argument that attacks on citizens may constitute attacks on
their state has been pressed in one other context, namely, where per-
sons residing in a foreign state are in imminent danger of death be-
cause of attacks on them by the government of the host state. In this
situation, two legal justifications have been asserted for the violation
of the host state's territory. One is that the attack on the citizens was
an attack on the state. The other is that the intrusion is not under-
taken to alter the host state's government or political system and
therefore is not a violation of U.N. Charter Article 2(4), which charac-
terizes as unlawful the "use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state."' 67
Neither of these arguments has been ruled upon by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (I.C.J.) or accepted by the Security Council. In
the Security Council discussion of Israel's armed intrusion into
Uganda in 1976, which Israel justified as an effort to rescue nationals
taken into Uganda by airplane hijackers, the Security Council was
split on the legality of the action. The Council's discussion yields little
learning on the points at issue because it was disputed whether
Uganda was responsible for the hostage-taking2- and because Israel
asserted both that its action constituted self-defense and that article
2(4) did not prohibit an intrusion for a rescue.' 9
Moreover, it is not clear that armed intervention to protect na-
tionals, grounded in either rationale, is permitted under international
65. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 26S2d mtg., at 43, U.N. Doc. SPV.2t,2 (19Sb).
66. G.A. Res. 41138, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Dz. A,!433
(19S7).
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
68. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg., at 3-5, U.N. Dc. STPVA939 (19761 (Uganda
representative stating that Uganda tried to secure release of hostages); id. at 9-12 (Israel
representative accusing Uganda of assisting hijackers).
69. l& at 13-14.
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law. In the absence of indicative state practice, many publicists find
such intervention to be prohibited by U.N. Charter Article 2(4),
thereby, implicitly rejecting the argument that an attack against citi-
zens is an attack against the state.70 One publicist who finds that pro-
tecting nationals abroad is not a lawful basis for intervention and is
not self-defense argues that "to equate an attack on nationals abroad
with an attack on the national state.., is fallacious. Nationals cannot
be identified with the national state for all purposes; for instance, a
state possesses sovereign immunity in foreign courts, but its nationals
do not."'71 The danger of a doctrine that permits armed intervention to
rescue nationals is that it can be abused easily by a state intervening
for other purposes.72
Other publicists find intervention in protection of nationals
abroad to be lawful.73 These scholars disagree as to whether the legal
basis for such intervention is self-defense on the theory that an attack
on nationals is an attack on the state or on the principle of necessity.
One publicist who finds such intervention lawful suggests that if a suf-
ficiently large community of nationals is attacked, this may constitute
an attack against the state, whereas "to imperil the safety of a single
national abroad is not to imperil the security of the state." 74 The liter-
ature provides no support for the view that an attack on a single indi-
vidual is an attack on the state.
To be sure, publicists have not in this context addressed the situa-
tion in which the single individual is an actual or former head of state.
At least where it is a former rather than an actual head of state, there
would appear to be little ground for finding a threat to the security of
the state.75
Even Iraq's motivation, if the U.S. allegations are true, to take
revenge against Bush for the 1991 Gulf War would not seem to render
an assassination plot against him as a former head of state a matter of
U.S. security sufficient to render the plot an attack on the United
70. BROWNLIE, supra note 46, at 342.
71. Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLI.
Tics 95, 107-08 (H. Bull ed., 1984).
72. QuitLEY, supra note 55, at 135-47 (noting U.S. intervention in Dominican Rcpub-
lic in 1966 had political aim although rationalized as a rescue); id. at 197-221 (noting U.S.
intervention in Grenada in 1983 also had political aim although rationalized as rescue).
73. Bow=r, supra note 60, at 87.
74. Id. at 93.
75. See Boris Vinogradov, Plot to Kill Bush Does Not Meet Definition of Aggression,
Hence American Use of Force Should Have Security Council Approval, IZVESTIIA, July 28,
1993, at 14 (I.V. Lukashuk, Institute of State and Law, Moscow, stating that a plot to
assassinate President Bush would not constitute aggression).
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States itself. Such an act would be a serious violation of the rights of
the United States, perhaps even more serious than a plot against some
other U.S. national abroad.1 6 It might even constitute a threat to the
peace, bringing into play the powers of the Security Council under
U.N. Charter chapters VI and VII. But that does not render the act
an armed attack in the sense of U.N. Charter article 51 that would
give rise to a right of self-defense.
The thrust of the article 51 limitation was to restrict self-defense
to serious situations so that it would not be used by states too readily,
particularly by states with alternative agendas that might seize upon
an international law violation by the target state as grounds for using
armed force against it.
VI. DOES THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE LAW ESTABLISH THAT AN ATTACK ON
CITIZENS IS AN ATTACK ON THEIR STATE?
The I.C.J. has never ruled on whether attacks on foreign citizens
constitute an "armed attack" against their state. In the Tehran hos-
tage case, private individuals took over U.S. diplomatic missions and
committed violence against U.S. officials there, and the Government
of Iran ratified their actions such that the I.C.J. said that the hostage-
takers' actions became those of Iran as a state. The Court resolved
the case on the basis of the law of diplomatic and consular protec-
tion 77 It did not address the question of whether Iran committed an
"armed attack" against the United States by the hostage-takings at its
missions.
However, in the course of its judgment, the I.C.J. expressed con-
cern about the unsuccessful U.S. aerial incursion into Iran to rescue
the hostages, which was undertaken while the case was pending.
Although making it clear that the issue of U.S. responsibility for the
incursion was not before it, the I.C.J. said that it "cannot fail to ex-
press its concern in regard to the United States' incursion into Iran."7'
The United States justified the incursion under article 51. In a
letter to the Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Donald McHenry
stated that the "mission was carried out by the United States in exer-
cise of its inherent right of self-defense with the aim of extricating
76. See supra note 60.
77. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 LCJ. 3, 41 (May 24).
78. Id. at 43.
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American nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Ira-
nian armed attack on our Embassy. 79
Two dissenting judges addressed the incursion in light of article
51. Judge Morozov criticized the majority for merely expressing con-
cern about the incursion. The majority, he said, "could have drawn
attention to the undeniable legal fact that article 51 of the Charter,
establishing the right of self-defense, may be invoked only 'if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."'"0
Judge Morozov added that in Ambassador McHenry's letter to the
Security Council, "there is no evidence that any armed attack had oc-
curred against the United States."'"
Judge Tarazi, also dissenting, said that "[a]rticle 51 provides for
the eventuality of that kind of operation [the incursion] only 'if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. '"'82 He
continued, "One can only wonder, therefore, whether an armed attack
attributable to the Iranian Government has been committed against
the territory of the United States, apart from its Embassy and Consul-
ates in Iran."83
With the Iraq raid, the Clinton Administration's position that an
attack on an ex-president is an attack on the state would permit a
dangerous expansion of the permissible scope of force in self-defense.
The position raises serious questions about the breadth of the princi-
ple for which the United States argued. Is it limited only to a plot
against an ex-president who, like Bush, was allegedly being targeted
for his actions against the state in question? Would it include other ex-
presidents? Would it include ex-secretaries of state, other ex-offi-
cials?84 Would it include private citizens who have had no government
79. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 486. The letter appears in Security Council documents as Let-
ter dated 25 April 1980 from the representative of the United States of America to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. Apr.-June 1980, at 28, U.N.
Doc. S/13908 (1980). Neither Iran nor the United States requested a Security Council
meeting on the incursion, and the Council did not discuss it. An earlier U.S. draft resolu-
tion on the Iran hostage-taking referred to it as "a serious threat to international peace and
security." Id. at 10. The draft resolution received 10 affirmative votes but was not adopted
because of a negative vote by the U.S.S.R., a permanent member of the Council, U.N.
SCOR, 35th Sess., 2191th mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2191 (1980).
80. 1980 I.CJ. 3, at 56-7 (Morozov, P., dissenting).
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id. at 64-65 (Tarazi, S., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. New Zealand devised the following principle: "Any nation that seeks to assassi-
nate the Head of State or a member of the senior political leadership of another State
commits an act of aggression. Such actions are at the most serious end of the scale because
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position? Since only strong states have the practical capacity to carry
out such raids, and only against weaker states, is the principle one that
promotes world order, or one that exacerbates the differences be-
tween the strong and the weak?
It is out of particular concern for the overuse of force by powerful
states like the United States that the prohibition against military inter-
vention in states has been strong in international law in the Charter
era. The Charter of the Organization of American States, drafted
with the history of U.S. intervention in Latin America in mind, pro-
hibits intervention more explicitly than the U.N. Charter.1:- Third
World states sponsored a U.N. General Assembly declaration that "no
State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State," and
that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggression."'
VII. CAN A FAILED PLOT BE AN ARMED ATTACK?
The Baghdad raid presents a question slightly different from that
raised in the preceding sections. Iraq did not, according to the allega-
tion, assassinate an ex-president; it merely organized a plot for that
purpose, a plot that failed well before approaching its goal. Assuming
the U.S. factual allegations to be accurate, the Iraqi plot was thwarted
at a stage that, in common law terminology, would be only a conspir-
acy.87 The plot did not proceed far enough to constitute an attempt,
Heads of State symbolize the sovereignty and integrity of their country." U.N, SCOR
3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 23.
85. Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 18, 2 UST. 2394, amended
21 U.S.T. 607, ("No State... has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing prin-
ciple prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted
threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural
elements.").
86. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 2, U.N, Doz, A914
(1965). Although the draft resolution was proposed by Third World states, it received
unanimous approval, with the exception of an abstention by the United Kingdom. W3tem
states voting in favor did not thereby indicate that they considered intervention to protect
nationals unlawful; they evidently construed the concept of intervening in internal affairs
not to include such intervention. Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Do es-
tic Affairs of State and Protection of Their Independence and Soverenty, lqb5 U.N.Y.B.
87-95 (1967).
87. LAFAxV & Scorr, supra note 49, at 542-68.
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under common law standards,8 even though U.S. officials referred to
the activity as an "attempt" on Bush's life.89
One will search state practice in vain for an episode that has been
considered an armed attack under U.N. Charter Article 2(4), in which
a state began a process of directing armed force against another state
and where the process was terminated under circumstances indicating
that it could not be resumed. This fact places the U.S. claim of
"armed attack" well outside the range of allegations of armed attack
that one finds in United Nations practice.
Article 51, to repeat, may be invoked only "if an armed attack
occurs." If steps are merely taken leading to an armed attack in the
future, the attack does not occur. The drafters were clear on permit-
ting force in self-defense only if the attack was carried to comple-
tion." To be sure, one can argue about attacks that are in process and
appear to be on the verge of completion, and, as indicated, some ar-
gue that in these situations one may use force in so-called anticipatory
self-defense. 91 But where an attack is thwarted, and there is no possi-
bility of its being completed, there can be no valid assertion that force
must be used in anticipation of expected completion.
VIfI. WAS THE RAID NECESSARY TO STOP
THE PLOT?
Even if a plot against Bush was afoot, as claimed by the United
States, and even if the plot could be deemed an armed attack against
the United States, the U.S. claim of self-defense faces another serious
hurdle. Force may be used only where it is necessary to protect the
victim state from the attack.92 With the alleged plot against Bush hav-
ing been thwarted at the Iraq-Kuwait border, there was no possibility
it would be carried to completion. Thus, there was no necessity of
force to stop it.
Albright did not focus on this element of self-defense in her Se-
curity Council presentation. Her argument dealt, instead, with possi-
ble future attacks of a similar type by Iraq, hence a concern to provide
88. Id. at 504-09.
89. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 2 (Albright referring to "an attempt to
murder a President of the United States").
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
91. See infra notes 95-96.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; The Caroline, 2 MOORE, reprinted in DIGEST OF INTERNA.
TIONAL LAW 412 (1906); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MicH. L. REv. 1620, 1635-37 (1984).
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a deterrent.93 To the extent that the U.S. argument focused on the
necessity element, it focused on a necessity to prevent possible future
attacks, not a necessity to stop the attack that gave rise to its counter-
force. Albright failed to argue that there was a necessity to use force
to stop the plot against Bush because she could not plausibly do so.
IX. WAS AN IRAQI ATTACK IN PROGRESS?
The Clinton Administration's references to potential future at-
tacks by Iraq, either against Bush or other U.S. citizens, may be taken
as a somewhat different argument in justification. Even though the
plot against Bush had failed, Iraq might revert to that plot, or it might
carry out acts of violence against other U.S. citizens. In the Security
Council, Albright described the aim of the raid as follows: "It was
designed to damage the terrorist infrastructure of the Iraqi regime,
reduce its ability to promote terrorism, and deter further acts of ag-
gression against the United States." 94
This argumentation relied implicitly on the notion that force can
be used by a state not only when an attack against it has begun, but
also when an attack is being prepared but is not imminent. The state
would assert that it must take the initiative to use force because by so
doing it can stop the anticipated attack more efficiently.
The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is controversial in inter-
national law, precisely because of the use of the term "occurs" in arti-
cle 51. A state viewing its putative adversary making preparations
that can have no end other than imminent armed attack may seek to
argue that an attack is already occurring, but the implied reliance on
anticipatory self-defense by the Clinton Administration goes far be-
yond any notion of imminence that has been accepted in the law of
self-defense. The Administration's argument implied a substantial ex-
pansion of the limits of anticipation. A credible argument that an-
other state plans to attack the following year would not, under article
51, provide a state with the justification of self-defense if it chose to
attack the state planning the attack.
Anticipatory self-defense is a doctrine of questionable validity,
given the article 51 requirement of an "armed attack" for invocation
of self-defense.9' Those publicists who support the doctrine and states
93. See infra Part LX.
94. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7. at 6.
95. Pmnr Jnssup, A MODERN LAWv OF NATIONS 166-67 (1948); LOVIS HELi:r, How
NATION S BEHAVE 141-45 (1979). Contra Derek Bowett, Reprisals Inrohinq Rccourse to
Armed Force, 66 AM. J. IN'VL L. 1, 4 (1972); BowET, supra note ,O. at 191-92
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
that have invoked it have said that the force anticipated must be im-
minent.96 The Clinton Administration argument ignored the require-
ment of imminence.
With the 1986 Libya raid, the United States at least argued that it
had evidence of planned future attacks on specific targets. Although
it did not specify dates, it asserted that Libya planned terrorist attacks
in the future against particular targets.97 It claimed to possess infor-
mation about specific attacks planned on U.S. installations but did not
make public details that would have permitted verification.9s
With the Baghdad raid, the United States did not claim knowl-
edge of any planned actions but relied exclusively on the prior alleged
attack. Its theory was that if Iraq had ordered the instant attack, it
might undertake similar actions in the future. This rationale stretches
anticipatory self-defense to the breaking point and well beyond any
concept of anticipatory self-defense previously suggested by states or
publicists.99
The aim of deterrence of future armed attacks is inconsistent with
the use of force in self-defense under article 51. Armed force may not
be employed to deter "further acts of aggression" unless the state is
confronted with an attack that is already in progress or at least immi-
nent. Otherwise the victim state must report its situation to the Secur-
ity Council and ask the Council to declare a threat to or a breach of
the peace and to take appropriate action. By taking action on its own,
the United States usurped the role of the Security Council."'
96. BowETr, supra note 60, at 184-93 (noting degree of imminence required for antici-
patory self-defense, in view of a publicist supporting doctrine).
97. Bernard Gwertzman, Plots on Global Scale Charged, N.Y. TNIrEs, Apr. 15, 1986, at
Al.
98. Id.; see Announcement by Speakes, supra note 64.
99. The danger of a broad scope for anticipatory self-defense is seen in Israel's attack
on Egypt in 1967. Egypt had not attacked, but Israel claimed it was about to, even though
it knew this was not true. Eric Rouleau, Le g6ndral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait
la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb. 29, 1968, at 1, 4 (Israeli Chief of Staff Itzhak Rabin stating that
when Israel attacked Egypt it knew Egypt was not about to attack Israel); Amnon Kape-
liouk, Israel dtait-il rdellement menac6 d'extermination?, LE MONDE, June 3, 1972, at 4
(General Matitiahu Peled, member of Israeli general staff, stating that the Israeli thcsis
that Egypt was about to attack was invented by the Israeli government only after the war);
Excerpts from Begin Speech at National Defense College, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1982, at A6
(Menachem Begin, member of cabinet, stating that Egypt's troop strength on border did
"not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us"); see also John Quigley, The United
Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedent for Israel's Arab Territories, 2 DuKE J. CO.w. &
INT'L L. 195, 206-07 (1992).
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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X. WAS THE BAGHDAD RAID A PROPORTIONAL
RESPONSE?
Even if the United States could surmount all the above hurdles,
its raid would still have to satisfy one more requirement of article 51.
Force may be used in self-defense only to the extent that is necessary
to thwart the other state's armed attack. A state under armed attack
may not, after repelling the aggressor's attack, go on to inflict super-
fluous damage. Force used in self-defense must be proportional to the
force to which it is a response. 1° 1
Here again the Charter principle of minimizing force between
states comes into play. Once the armed attack has been thwarted, no
more armed force may be used. To be sure, a state under attack is
accorded a margin of judgment in determining how much force is
needed to stop the armed attack. It need not necessarily limit itself to
the precise quantity of force employed by the attacker. It may employ
more force than the aggressor, if required to stop the aggressor. How-
ever, once the aggressor state has been repelled, a defending state
must cease its use of force.'02
This standard is difficult to apply to the United States' force
against Iraq, since, as indicated above, 0 3 force was not necessary at all
to stop Iraq's putative armed attack. Thus, strictly speaking, the ques-
tion of proportionality did not arise.
The United States, however, was quite aware of the requirement
of proportionality. Albright told the Security Council pointedly, "our
response has been proportionate."''1 She made this statement in the
context of explaining why the United States had chosen the Intelli-
gence Service headquarters as its target. As for the deaths in Bagh-
dad, she said, "one should keep in mind that had the Iraqi attempt in
Kuwait succeeded hundreds of civilians could have died."'L
It was in this sense that Albright used the concept of proportion-
ality. This is quite different from the meaning of that concept as it is
found in the law of self-defense. Given that the putative Iraqi plot
had been thwarted, the United States did not need to use force, and
hence the only "proportional" force would have been no force at all.
101. BROWNUE, supra note 46, at 260-64.
102. Schachter, supra note 92, at 1637-38 ("Acts done in self-defense must not exceed
in manner or aim the necessity provoking them.").
103. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
104. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 6.
105. Id. at 7.
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Even if, however, one could find justification for some use of
force by the United States, the level of force it used against Iraq was
substantial by any measure. The Intelligence Services headquarters
building was located in a densely populated residential area of Bagh-
dad, called the Mansour neighborhood. With twenty-three missiles
being fired, one could not reasonably expect them all to land on tar-
get. The missiles were sufficiently powerful that on impact they left
thirty-foot craters in the ground.
Lieutenant General Jack Sheehan told reporters that the Penta-
gon expected some of the missiles to miss their target.1' 6 Firing such
missiles into an urban area where the population lay sleeping was all
but certain to cause civilian casualties. The Clinton Administration
was aware when it fired the missiles that it was probably killing peo-
ple. To kill Iraqi civilians in response to the alleged failed plot against
Bush was out of proportion by any reasonable standard. The Security
Council has focused on this element in its consideration of counter-
attacks by states, and when the number of casualties inflicted was well
in excess of those inflicted in the initial attack, the Council has typi-
cally found the counter-attack unlawful. 0 7
XI. WAS THE RAID A REPRISAL RATHER THAN
SELF-DEFENSE?
President Clinton described the Baghdad raid as retaliation for
the alleged plot against Bush.' He said, "we sent the message we
needed to send."'1 9 The raid, said Ambassador Albright, would "deter
further acts of aggression against the United States." 110 This is the lan-
guage not of self-defense, but of reprisal.
Ambassador Albright sought to depict the U.S. action as self-de-
fense because that is all the Charter permits as justification, but the
Administration's statements about the raid reflected a reprisal. The
106. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Strike Crippled Iraq's Capacity for Terror, N.Y. Tu~ws,
June 28, 1993, at Al.
107. Bowett, supra note 95, at 33-36.
108. G. Robert Hillman, Iraq Target Badly Damaged, Pentagon Says Baghdad Reports 8
Civilians Killed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 28, 1993, at Al; see aso Thomas L. Fried-
man, Raid on Baghdad: An Assessment; the Missile Message, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1993, at
Al (quoting unnamed Administration officials as saying that they "were planning all along
to retaliate against Iraq, if and when we had conclusive proof that it was responsible for the
assassination attempt on Bush").
109. Gaylord Shaw, Crippling Attack; Hit on Iraqi Center Successful, US. Says, but Ci-
vilians Killed, NEWSDAY, June 28, 1993, at 3; Schmitt, supra note 106.
110. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 6.
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raid was an after-the-fact action that was not necessary to stop any
actual or imminent Iraqi attack, but was designed to deter possible
future attacks at unspecified times against unspecified targets.
White House officials said that an additional purpose was to deter
terrorist attacks by other states, particularly by the Sudan and Iran,
whom they suspected of a role in the then recent bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York City.1 '1 That purpose too bespoke
an aim inconsistent with self-defense. The U.S. concern vith states
other than Iraq, and its admission that this concern figured in its deci-
sion to act against Iraq, removed the raid still further from self-
defense.
But even if one considers the U.S. action as a response to Iraq
alone, it does not, for the reasons indicated above, constitute self-de-
fense. It was rather a reprisal.1 Reprisal is the use of armed force,
undertaken in response to a past use of armed force by another state,
but where there was no ongoing attack and hence no need of force for
self-defense purposes. Force could be used, under the doctrine of re-
prisal, as a response to a prior and already completed use of force.
The doctrine of reprisal was accepted in international law in the
pre-U.N. Charter era, when no international mechanism existed to re-
spond to a threat to the peace." 3 Force could be used in reprisal,
either to deter future attacks or as retribution for past attacks, so long
as the level of the force used did not exceed that of the prior force., 4
The doctrine of reprisal, however, did not survive into the U.N.
Charter era. Reprisals today are unlawful." 5 Although the Charter
did not mention reprisal, it implicitly eliminated the doctrine. The
Charter prohibits force in article 2(4) and then provides for only one
111. Friedman, supra note 108 (quoting unnamed Administration officials as 3afin- that
while Iraq was the primary target of the raid, "the situation in New York was very much on
our minds and an explicit part of the discussions. We hoped that the response would Send a
message to those who work in the intelligence business that there is a danger, a danger to
them personally, if they get involved in state-sponsored terrorism.").
112. See Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, The Baghdad Blmder TEz. L:w., July 26,
1993, at 16.
113. BROWNLIE, supra note 46, at 220 ("The reprisal appears in the classical doctrine of
international law as a lawful mode of self-help, part execution and part sanction. Its value
lay in the possibility of gaining redress without creating a formal state of % ar.").
114. Naulilaa Arbitration (Port. v. Ger.), July 31, 1928, 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, also in A'rNo.
TATED DIGEST OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw C, Ss 1927-28 526 (Arnold McNair & H.
Lauterpacht eds., 1931) (defining conditions for and permissible scope of reprisal); Bo,,%ett,
supra note 95, at 2-3 (defining conditions for use of force in reprisal).
115. Bow=r, supra note 60, at 13.
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exception: self-defense in article 51.116 The idea enshrined in the U.N.
Charter was that only self-defense would justify military force. Only if
a state were the victim of an ongoing military attack could it take up
arms against another.117
The Charter omitted reprisal as a legitimate use of force out of
concern that revenge only begets revenge. 118 Also, under the Charter,
if an attack by one state against another threatens the peace, states
must settle their difference by peaceful means, 119 and threats to the
peace are to be handled by the U.N. Security Council, not by the ag-
grieved state acting alone.1 20 If action needs to be taken it should be
116. BROWNLIE, supra note 46, at 219; see id. at 265 ("There is a general assumption by
jurists that the Charter prohibited self-help and armed reprisals."); Bowett, supra note 95,
at 1 ("Few propositions about international law have enjoyed more support than the prop-
osition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisals is
illegal. Although, indeed, the words 'reprisals' and 'retaliation' are not to be found in the
Charter, this proposition was generally regarded by writers and by the Security Council as
the logical and necessary consequence of the prohibition of force in Article 2(4), the in-
junction to settle disputes peacefully in Article 2(3) and the limiting of permissible force by
states to self-defense.").
117. The only possible exception would be situations of a series of attacks back and
forth between two states, where it may be difficult to characterize a particular attack as a
response to another particular attack. Bowett, supra note 95, at 2-10.
118. The U.S. raid drew threats of retaliation from Iraq. A senior official of the Infor-
mation Ministry wrote, "Iraq... must retaliate against the aggression, and organize legiti-
mate acts of defense against American and Zionist interests, as well as the agents among
the suspect rulers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia." Anton La Guardia, As Baghdad Threatens
To Be Another 'Vietnam or Beirut'for America, President Clinton Is Discovering How Con-
flict Can Boost Flagging Support; Iraq Pledges to Retaliate Against US, DAILY TELEORAI'H,
June 30, 1993, at 12. The United States issued a warning to Iraq not to act in response to
the raid. Radio Broadcasts Exchange of Letters between US and Iraqi Representatives, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 1, 1993, pt. 4, Middle E. Page, at ME/1729/A
(quoting Republic of Iraq Radio, Baghdad 1043 gmt, June 29,1993, which gave text of U.S.
letter warning Iraq against retaliating); see also Iraq Replies to US Warning Against Any
Retaliation, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 30, 1993, pt. 4, Middle E. Page,
at ME/1728/1.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 ("All Members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and jus-
tice, are not endangered."). Id. art. 33 ("The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.").
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 37 ("Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in
Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the
Security Council."). See also Bowett, supra note 95, at 2 (stating "that a total outlawry of
armed reprisals, such as the drafters of the Charter intended, presupposed a degree of
community cohesiveness, and with it, a capacity for collective action to suppress any resort
to unlawful force...").
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collective action by the Security Council,121 or by a regional security
organization like the Organization of American States.'2'
Collective action would have the authority of the world commu-
nity behind it. Under the Charter, a state should not use force unilat-
erally and then go to the Security Council and ask the Council not to
condemn it. However, this is precisely how the United States handled
the Baghdad raid.
XH1. SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE ON REPRISALS
The line between reprisal and self-defense, to be sure, is not al-
ways easy to draw. It is a line, nonetheless, that exists in the law.'
Self-defense is armed force by a state, used because it is necessary to
stop an armed attack, namely, an action by another state that violates
U.N. Charter Article 2(4). Reprisal, on the other hand, is armed force
by a state used in response to an armed attack by another state when
the force is not necessary to stop the initial attack. Self-defense is
aimed at stopping an attack, whereas reprisals have been described as
"punitive."124 With a reprisal, the initial attack is completed, and the
force used in response is undertaken for other purposes, as a sanction
for the initial attack or to deter future attacks or both.t2
The Security Council has stood firmly behind the principle that
reprisal is aggression.126 The issue was addressed in the 1964 British
air attacks on Yemen, which Britain justified as a legitimate response
to prior Yemeni attacks on the territory of the South Arabian Federa-
121. U.N. CHARTER arts. 34-51. See Ratner & Lobel, supra note 112 (stating that any
action against Iraq should have been taken by the Security Council). see also EP Deplores
U.S. Missile Attack on Baghdad, REUTER EuR. CoM M1N rr REP., July 15, 19-3, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File (stating that the European Parliament by resolution
criticized the United States for not consulting the Security Council).
122. U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54
123. Bowett, supra note 95, at 2-10 (noting that the distinction becomes difficult in the
case of repeated attacks back and forth between two states).
124. Bowrr, supra note 60, at 13.
125. See Bowett, supra note 95, at 3 ("Self-defense is penaissible for the purpo:e of
protecting the security of the state and the essential rights-in particular the rights of terri-
torial integrity and political independence-upon which that security depends. In contrast,
reprisals are punitive in character. Tey seek to impose reparation for the harm done, or to
compel a satisfactory settlement of the dispute created by the initial illegal act, or to com-
pel the delinquent state to abide by the law in the future.").
126. Bowett, supra note 95, at 7 (stating, with regard to Security Council practice on
Israel's cross-border raids at guerrilla bases in 1950s and 1960s, that "[oln occasion after
occasion ... the Security Council formally condemned Israel for illegal reprisals and re-
jected this form of plea of self-defense").
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tion. 127 Britain told the Council that the action was self-defense,
rather than reprisal,"z but the Council rejected the British argument
and issued a condemnation of Britain in which it stated that it "con-
demns reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.' '1 29
Similarly, when Israel bombed the Beirut airport in response to
the 1968 bombing of an Israeli airliner at the Athens airport, the
Council condemned Israel, apparently viewing the action as a reprisal,
and hence unlawful. 130 In an earlier series of raids by Israel into
neighboring territory directed against guerrilla bases, which were un-
dertaken in response to recent guerrilla raids or shelling into Israel,
the Security Council considered Israel's counter-force a reprisal and
found it unlawful. 13
In Africa, Portugal confronted independence-seeking guerrilla
movements that found safe haven in neighboring states from which
they launched raids into Portuguese-held territory. In two incidents,
Portugal counter-attacked the neighboring states, and the Security
Council, without using the term "reprisal," condemned Portugal for its
actions.132
With its 1986 raid into Libya, the United States sought to justify
the action primarily as a response to Libya's alleged orchestration of a
127. The Federation was a British protectorate, but was considered by Yemen to be an
occupied sector of Yemen. U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1109th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1109
(1964) (statement of Mr. Geghman, Yemen).
128. Id. at 4 (U.K. delegate stating that "this action was not a retaliation or a reprisal,"
rather "it was a measure of defence").
129. S.C. Res. 188, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1964, at 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev.1 (1966) (U.K. and U.S.A. abstained).
130. S.C. Res. 262, U.N. SCOR, 23rd Sess., Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1968, at 12, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1970) (finding that the raid violated U.N.
Charter). The precedential value of this decision is weakened by the fact that Israel did not
have clear evidence that Lebanon was responsible for the act to which Israel was respond-
ing; hence, the Council may have condemned Israel because it attacked a state that had
committed no prior violation against Israel.
131. S.C. Res. 101, U.N. SCOR, 8th Sess., Resolution and Decisions of the Securi,
Council 1953, at 4, U.N. Doc. SIINF/8/Rev.1 (1965) (finding "the retaliatory action... by
... Israel... a violation of... the Charter of the United Nations"); S.C. Res. 228, U.N.
SCOR, 21st Sess., Resolution and Decisions of the Security Council 1966, at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1968) ("emphasiz[ing] to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be
tolerated"); S.C. Res. 248, U.N. SCOR, 23rd Sess., Resolution and Decisions of the Security
Council 1968, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1970) ("declar[ing] that such actions of mili-
tary reprisal ... cannot be tolerated"); id. at 10 (reaffirming Resolution 248); S.C. Res. 265,
U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., Resolution and Decisions of the Security Council 1969, at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1 (1970) (reaffirming Resolutions 248 & 256).
132. S.C. Res. 273, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., Resolution and Decisions of the Security
Council 1969, at 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/INFi24/Rev.1 (1970).
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fatal bombing at a nightclub in Berlin where U.S. service personnel
were patrons. 33 As with the Baghdad raid, the U.S. justification was
that the action was a response to an alleged completed action by the
other state.134 A majority of the Security Council's members voted to
condemn the United States, but it was not clear whether they did so
because the action was a reprisal, or because they doubted the facts as
alleged by the United States.
The Baghdad raid fits neatly within the notion of reprisal. One
must strain the facts considerably, however, to fit it within self-
defense.
XII. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE IN DEALING
WITH THE RAID
Ambassador Hamdoon challenged the Security Council by charg-
ing that the United States had taken over its role. "[T]he Security
Council," he said, "must not allow some of its members, by taking
military action, to usurp the Council's principal role of maintaining
international peace and security."1 -
If the United States deemed Iraq's actions a threat to the peace,
the proper course was to approach the Security Council in the first
instance, rather than to take unilateral military action. The United
States could have introduced a draft resolution to declare the assassi-
nation plot a threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, and to take
appropriate measures, which might have included negotiations with
Iraq, or might have gone further and imposed sanctions. The Council
had confronted Iraq on other issues, and the United States had no
reason to fear Council reluctance to condemn Iraq or to take strong
action against it, if circumstances called for such.
133. The United States explained the Libya mid in terms that bespoke reprizil3 "It i3
our hope that this action will pre-empt and discourage Libyan attacks against inno:ent
civilians in the future." Announcement by Speakes, supra note 64, at A13. The United
States reportedly told the United Kingdom, from whose bases U.S. planes flew to Libya for
the raid, that it planned to assert reprisal as justification. The United Kingdom go,. eminent
reportedly agreed to use of its bases on condition that the Administration forego im oza-
tion of the doctrine of reprisal. The United States invoked anticipatory self-defens., not
reprisal. Joseph Lelyveld, Intense Talks Led to Thatcher Ruling, N.Y. Tz'~ses, Apr. 16, 19E6,
at A14.
134. Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force
Abroad, 8 WHI-rmR L. REv. 711, 729-32 (19S6) (pointing out that the Libya raid came
after the completion of the alleged Libyan act and concluding that the raid was a reprizil
rather than self-defense).
135. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 12.
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The U.S. case, however, would have been weak. The Security
Council would have been hard pressed to agree with the U.S. factual
claims without further inquiry. On the legal side, the Council might
have refused to say that the plot, even if found to exist, constituted an
attack on the United States. The Council might well have found the
U.S. action to constitute a reprisal. It seems clear that the United
States preferred to act on its own and then to present the Council with
a fait accompli.
Curiously, given the Security Council's practice on reprisals, it did
not criticize the United States for its unilateral action against Iraq.136
Although the Baghdad raid appears to have been a reprisal, no mem-
ber state proposed a resolution to condemn the United States. 137
Among Council members, China alone expressed serious criticism of
the raid. The Chinese foreign ministry said, "We are opposed to any
act that contravenes the U.N. charter and norms governing interna-
tional relations. Nor are we in favor of any action, including use of
force, that may aggravate tension in the region. '113S
In the 1993 Baghdad raid, as in the 1986 Libya raid, the United
States said that in addition to the evidence it was disclosing, it pos-
sessed information from confidential sources that it would not reveal.
In 1986 the Security Council did not find this reticence persuasive. In
1993 it did.
One factor in the Council's failure to act may have been its prior
history with Iraq. Albright told the Council that "although we took
action under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, there is a
broader context of which members of the Security Council are only
too well aware. Since its invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iraq
has repeatedly and consistently refused to comply with the resolutions
of the Council. '139 Although Albright did not cite any of the Security
Council resolutions relating to the Gulf War as legal justification for
136. But see Bowett, supra note 95, at 10-17 (noting instances in which Council declined
to condemn actions that appeared to be reprisals, and author opining that reason was that
reprisal was proportional to initial attack).
137. But see Ethan Bronner, Arab States Assail Killing of Civilians, Strike on Baghdad,
Bos-rON GLOBE, June 28, 1993, at 1 (noting Arab League condemnation of raid).
138. Paul Holmes, Baghdad Blitz Stirs Chinese Concern, European Misgivings, REtrrER
LIBR. REP., June 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Outside the
Council, most Arab governments condemned the raid, as did major opposition parties in
Britain and France. For example, British Labor Party foreign affairs spokesperson George
Robertson called the raid "questionable in law, doubtful in morality," and the French So-
cialist Party said the raid involved "taking the law into one's own hand." Id.
139. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 8.
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the raid, she led the Council through a litany of Iraqi delicts. 14 9 She
concluded: "[W]e insist on full Iraqi compliance with all United Na-
tions resolutions. Through a policy of firmness and consistency, in-
cluding readiness to use force if necessary, the international
community must frustrate Iraq's efforts to ignore the will of the Coun-
cil."14 She called Iraq's government a "criminal regime."142
However, Albright appeared to rely on the negative attitude to-
wards Iraq in the Security Council in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
Council members may have been influenced by this attitude. At the
very time of the raid, the Council and Iraq were in a difficult relation-
ship involving resistance by Iraq to efforts by the Council to force Iraq
to disarm and to change its domestic policies relating to treatment of
minorities. 43 United Nations inspectors in Iraq were being denied
the access they sought in order to search for weaponry and to ensure
against future Iraqi weapons tests. Council members may have been
concerned that any Council action that appeared to favor Iraq would
undermine its efforts to pressure Iraq on these other issues. The Se-
curity Council made little pretense of giving the Iraqi charge of ag-
gression serious consideration. Its meeting on the Baghdad raid lasted
only fifty minutes.
Even though the Council's inaction on the matter supported the
U.S. position, the reactions of member states ranged across a spec-
trum from approval to disapproval. The United Kingdom was the
most enthusiastic in support, terming the action "proper and propor-
tionate."'" Russia was one of the few members to address the raid in
legal terms, and it endorsed the U.S. position, saying that the actions
by the United States are justified since they arise from the right of
states to individual and collective self-defense, in accordance with arti-
cle 51 of the Charter.4 5 Hungary also found the U.S. action "justi-
140. Id. (breach of Security Council resolution 687 on ceasefire ending Gulf War, re-
fusal to comply with requirements of U.N. commission on weapons destruction, refusal to
accept Security Council resolution 715 on long-term monitoring of weapons program, re-
jection by Iraq of the U.N.-drawvn border between Iraq and Kuwait, repression of papula-
tion in violation of Security council resolution 6S8, refusal to accept Security Council
resolutions 706 and 712 that would allow Iraq to sell oil to meet the needs of its citizens).
141. Id. at 8-9.
142. I. at 9.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 21.
145. Id. at 22. This position evoked a negative reaction from the Russian Supreme So-
viet, which issued a declaration condemning the raid. See Judith Perera, Reluctant Russian
Support, MIDLE E. Irr'L, July 9, 1993, at 5; see also Sergei Flatov, Our Commcntary
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fled," it said, by "the grave nature of the latest instance of the
Government of Iraq's behavior on the international scene. '146
Several members, without specifically approving the action, ex-
pressed "understanding." France said that it "fully understands" the
U.S. action. 147 Spain said, "[W]e understand the action the United
States Government felt forced to take in the exceptional circum-
stances of this case." ' Japan found "an unavoidable situation in
which the United States Government could not help but take
action."'1 49
New Zealand said it could "understand why, faced with the evi-
dence of a serious act of aggression.., any country would feel obliged
to consider responding with force."'150 But, alone among the mem-
bers, New Zealand addressed the adequacy of the U.S. proof, noting
that it had "not had an opportunity to study the evidence in detail,"'-"
a statement that suggested it did not necessarily accept the facts as
presented by Ambassador Albright.
Council members from the Third World, who in years past would
have been critical of the United States on such an issue, adopted a
stance of neutrality. Brazil "took note" of the U.S. finding of "clear
and compelling evidence" of the plot "with particular concern," with-
out expressly accepting the U.S. evidence and then expressed its hope
that the situation could be handled in a way that would strengthen
U.N. efforts to combat terrorism and "to promote the rule of law
among nations."' 52 In a statement on behalf of Council members Dji-
bouti, Morocco, Pakistan, Venezuela and itself, Cape Verde, in regard
to the U.S. evidence, noted that "[t]his is a subject which is of the
utmost concern to the members of the Caucus.1 5 3 In a formulation
that did not name the United States but implicitly criticized it, these
five members urged "restraint by all States, consistent with the princi-
ples of the Charter and in particular for the maintenance of interna-
Instead of International Law-the Law of Brute Force, PRAVDA, June 29, 1993, at 3 (de-
nouncing the raid).
146. U.N. SCOR 3245th mtg., supra note 7, at 18.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id. at 24.
149. Id. at 16.
150. Id. at 23.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 17-18.
153. Id. at 16.
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tional peace and security and the avoidance of the use of force
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."' 4
China was the most disapproving of the U.S. action, although its
criticism was mild. China said that disputes "should be settled
through peaceful means of dialogue and consultation. We are op-
posed to any action that can contravene the Charter of the United
Nations and norms of international relations. We do not endorse any
action that might intensify the tension in the region, including the use
of force."'"5
XIV. CONCLUSION
The Security Council's inaction on the Baghdad raid is an indica-
tion of the hegemony enjoyed by the United States at the United Na-
tions in the post-Cold War era.'55  The major-power members
followed the U.S. lead.' The Third World members may have felt
that direct criticism of the U.S. action might jeopardize financial aid
from the United States.'- In the Security Council debate over Iraq in
1990, the United States wooed Third World members of the Security
Council by promising financial aid.'5 9 After Yemen, then a Council
member, voted against the critical resolution that led to the Gulf War,
the United States cut off economic aid to Yemen.'()
154. Id. at 17.
155. Id. at 21.
156. Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Dceision.Ma t:ing:
Precarious Legitimacy, 85 Am. J. Irrr'l L 516, 522-24 (1991) (on U.S. predominance in the
Council in the context of Council action against Iraq in 1990).
157. Ian Williams, U.S. Takeover at the U.N., NrzoN, Oct. 12, 1992, at 392 (-Of the
permanent members of the Council, Britain and France are morbidly terrified of lasing
their seats to Germany and Japan, while the other two, China and Ruslia, can b2 guaran-
teed to toe the U.S. line for economic reasons."). This statement is perhap3 overdrawn
with respect to China, which may have moderated its opposition to the United States in the
Security Council but nonetheless takes an independent position.
15S. Id. at 392 (quoting Third World diplomats who criticize the United States for pres-
suring them to vote with it at the United Nations, and who state that this pre--sure in-
creased after the end of the Cold War). This factor may have affected the Russian stance as
well.
159. World News Tonight, ABC-TV, Nov. 29, 1990, available in LEXIS, Ne:.as Library,
Omni File.
160. Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., The United States Commitment to the Norms of the Unacd
Nations and Its Related Agencies, 1 TRANsNAT'L L. & CON7EMP. PROas. 12-, 141 (19)1);
Judith Miller, Kuwaiti Envoy Says Baker Vowed 'No Concessions' to Iraqis, N.Y. TI. ES.
Dec. 5, 1990, at A22 (quoting Kuwaiti ambassador to United States as saying that Secretary
Baker told him United States would cut aid to Yemen because of its vote on Rezolution
678); Rick Atkinson & Barton Gelman, Iraq Trying to Shelter Jets in Iran, U.S. Says Sad-
dam Says Much Blood Will Be Shed, VAsm PosT, Jan. 29, 1991, at Al (State Department
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The Baghdad raid was a reprisal and was undertaken on the basis
of factual information that the Council did not verify. By accepting
the United States explanation and by declining to investigate Iraq's
complaint, the Security Council, in this instance, abdicated its role as
protector of international peace. By failing to demonstrate even-
handedness and a dedication to the rule of law regardless of the iden-
tity of the violator, the Council undermined its ongoing efforts to
force Iraq to comply with other Security Council resolutions. The
Council's inaction fed the Iraqi view that the Security Council was
engaged in a vendetta against it.
informed Congress it would cut aid to Yemen from a planned $22 million to under $3
million; State Department did not deny published report that after the vote on Resolution
678, a U.S. diplomat told Yemen Ambassador AI-Ashtal, "that will be the most expensive
vote you will have cast").
